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FOREWORD-ANTITRUST LAW AND
POLICY: STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION
C. Paul Rogers III*
NTITRUST law and policy is nothing if not fluid. For almost
one hundred twenty years, it has evolved, changed, widened,
narrowed, advanced, retreated, circled back, and re-evolved.
The rule of reason, which caused a firestorm when the Supreme Court
created it in the famous Standard Oil decision of 1911,1 became well en-
trenched in subsequent Supreme Court opinions like Chicago Board of
Trade.2 It fell out of favor in the Warren Court days, but has made a
startling comeback in recent years. The bright line per se rule, in con-
trast, has retrenched. Distrust about its potential overbroad use has led,
at least in part, to the so-called "quick look," a third analytical methodol-
ogy. (If the quick look was supposed to bring clarity to antitrust analysis,
it has failed. The first Supreme Court decision to consider directly, rather
than obliquely, the quick look split five to four on the appropriateness of
its application.)
In section 2, the prohibition against monopolization, the pendulum has
swung dramatically as well. Where courts once paid lip service to the
requirement of exclusionary conduct and nailed monopolists for almost
any activity in the marketplace, the range of permissible monopolistic be-
havior has expanded exponentially as judicial recognition has taken hold
that big is not necessarily bad. Somewhat quixotically perhaps, the Su-
preme Court has more recently tried to provide more content to and thus
guidance about what a monopolist can and cannot do, even as it has in
the section 1 arena relied more on the seemingly amorphous rule of rea-
son, which frequently requires a balancing of apples and oranges.
The fluidity and continuing evolution of antitrust policy is perhaps
more comprehensible when one considers what is in the mix. It is hard to
fathom another area of law where politics, economics, and philosophy are
thrown into a legal scheme in which Congress provided such a broad-
brush statute as the Sherman Act. Recall that the act outlaws "[e]very
contract, combination .... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade" as well as
conduct which monopolizes or attempts to monopolize, without defining
any of the operative terms. Is it any wonder that we have yet to settle on
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what the goal or goals of antitrust law should be, although we are argua-
bly getting closer to some form of consumer welfare model?
Also, not surprisingly, given the economic and political "inputs," to use
a favored antitrust term, that influence antitrust policy, the law has long
struggled with indeterminacy and unpredictability. Those are serious is-
sues, considering that potential criminal liability or treble damages or
both can be and often are at stake. With the Supreme Court, the Courts
of Appeal, Congress, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Trade
Commission all having, to a greater or lesser degree, antitrust policy and
decision-making roles, it is little wonder that antitrust has struggled for
coherency in the midst of change.
Thus, with all of these moving parts, antitrust scholars continue to face
a tall order in trying to figure out where antitrust has been, where it is
now, and where it is going. This symposium, put together by the editors
of the SMU Law Review and titled Evolution and Change in Antitrust
Law, presents an important slice of that effort. Included are attempts to
make sense of doctrinal issues, such as Professor Marina Lao's insightful
assessment of the essential facilities doctrine and its place in our modern
technological world, Professor Jim Ponsoldt's concern for the continuing
primacy of the per se rule for price fixing and market allocation agree-
ments, and my analysis of consumer welfare as a requirement for group
boycott illegality. Professor Peter Carstensen argues that at least some of
the confusion about contemporary antitrust doctrine is not top down but
rather stems from misapplication and misinterpretation of Supreme
Court decisions by lower courts and, in some cases, by the Supreme
Court of itself. Professor Rudy Peritz's whimsical but thought-provoking
essay offers a quick tour of the history of U.S. antitrust policy and argues
that consumer welfare should be the single focus, allowing freedom of
contract is necessary to that end, and sparing antitrust enforcement is
good antitrust policy.
Professor Spencer Waller provides additional historical perspective in
his thorough look at the influence of John Paul Stevens, the only sitting
Justice who was an antitrust practitioner before taking the bench, on the
development and application of the rule of reason. Similarly, Professor
Bill Page examines the Government's early twentieth century prosecu-
tion of U.S. Steel, as an outgrowth of the infamous Gary price-fixing din-
ners of steel executives, to measure the case's impact on and lessons
learned about section 1 of the Sherman Act's concerted action require-
ment. Professor Ed Burnet considers a very contemporary question of
procedure and doctrine: the impact of quick look analysis on the grant of
summary judgment in antitrust cases. While the quick look is rather new
to the antitrust fold, the use of summary judgment in private antitrust
conspiracy litigation has evolved and changed markedly over the last
forty years.
Thus, the symposium collectively takes a look back, engages in a posi-
tive assessment of where antitrust doctrine now stands, and, in many
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cases, a normative analysis about where it should be heading. The past
certainly contains lessons for the present and future in antitrust, as else-
where in our legal system. Of course, it is always a challenge to assess
whether we should be guided by what went before or whether what went
before was mistaken policy which we should avoid at all costs. These are
issues that antitrust scholars and policy-makers continue to wrestle with,
as illustrated by the articles that follow.
I would like to acknowledge and thank current and past members of
the SMU Law Review Board of Editors including Andrew Cookingham,
Bailey Pham, Meghan Kruzeiger, Matireya Tomlinson, and Brooke
Scheib for embracing the idea of this symposium issue and then providing
the heavy lifting.
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